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UNSAFE ASSERTIONS: REPLY TO TURRI 
Martijn Blaauw (m.j.blaauw@tudelft.nl) & Jeroen de Ridder (g.j.de.ridder@vu.nl) 
 
John Turri has recently provided two problem cases for the knowledge account of assertion 
(KAA) to argue for the express knowledge account of assertion (EKAA). We defend KAA by 
explaining away the intuitions about the problem cases and by showing that our explanation is 
theoretically superior to EKAA. 
 
Assertion; Knowledge; Knowledge Account of Assertion; Safety 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the simple knowledge account of assertion (KAA), one may assert P only if one 
knows that P. John Turri [2011] presents two problem cases that aim to show that KAA is 
incomplete. In response, he defends a modified knowledge account of assertion, the express 
knowledge account of assertion (EKAA), according to which one may assert P only if one’s 
assertion that P expresses one’s knowledge that P. He argues furthermore that EKAA is 
supported by independent theoretical considerations. We defend KAA by explaining away the 
intuitions about Turri’s problem cases in terms of the assertoric unsafety of the assertions in 
question and by arguing that our explanation is theoretically superior to EKAA on two counts. 
 
2. Turri’s Argument for EKAA 
Turri’s main motivation for EKAA are two problem cases for KAA. Here is one such case:  
 
Spiro 
Spiro is a spiteful guy who relishes causing people emotional pain. Out of spite, he plans to 
tell Lois that her fiancé just died. Some time before he embarks to execute his plan, he 
receives a text message from a reliable informant reporting that Lois’s fiancé has indeed 
just died. So Spiro knows that the fiancé died. But this knowledge doesn’t motivate him in 
the least to tell Lois that her fiancé died. He goes ahead and tells her out of pure spite. 
[Ibid.: 42] 
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Turri intuits that Spiro’s assertion is epistemically impermissible. But KAA fails to rule it as 
impermissible since Spiro knows what he asserts. EKAA, however, accommodates the 
intuition. Spiro’s assertion expresses his spite, not his knowledge, where ‘expressing’ must be 
understood as a non-deviant causal relation between the mental state of knowing and the 
assertion [ibid.: 42n12]. 
Turri’s second motivation for EKAA is that it fits with broader theoretical 
considerations in ways that KAA doesn’t. EKAA is coherent with virtue epistemology and it 
fits in a general pattern of normative assessment. Just as ‘permissibly A-ing requires more 
than A-ing while you have the authority to A’ [ibid.: 43], permissibly asserting requires more 
than knowing what one asserts, even though knowledge gives one the authority to assert. In 
general, permissibly A-ing also requires that you A in the appropriate way. Applied to 
assertion, this means that one’s assertion should also express knowledge. We find the same 
pattern with action, as Turri illustrates with the following case: Executioner is authorised to 
kill Prisoner. But Executioner kills permissibly only if he kills in the appropriate way (for 
instance, by giving a fatal injection).  
 
3. Unsafe Assertions 
As a first step towards defending KAA, we argue that the intuition that Spiro’s assertion is 
epistemically impermissible can be explained away in four stages.  
 First, for any subject S who asserts P whilst knowing that P, call S’s assertion 
assertorically unsafe iff S would also have asserted P without knowing that P. (Assertoric 
unsafety is different from epistemic unsafety, where S’s true belief that P is unsafe iff S would 
have easily believed P without P being true.) Second, when evaluating an assertorically 
unsafe assertion one is naturally led to consider those nearby possible worlds in which S 
asserts P whilst not knowing that P. Third, the assertion in those possible worlds will be 
intuited to be epistemically impermissible. Fourth, the intuition that the assertion is 
impermissible in those possible worlds taints our intuitions about the assertion in the actual 
world, so that we mistakenly intuit that the actual assertion is epistemically impermissible.  
 Spiro’s assertion is assertorically unsafe. He would also have told Loïs that her fiancé 
had died without knowing it. This leads one to consider those nearby possible worlds in which 
Spiro asserts without knowing. In these possible worlds, his assertion is intuited to be 
epistemically impermissible—and rightfully forbidden by KAA. This intuited 
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impermissibility taints our intuitions about the actual world so that we mistakenly intuit that 
Spiro’s assertion is impermissible in the actual world as well. But, as a matter of fact, his 
actual assertion is epistemically permissible—and rightfully licensed by KAA: nothing goes 
wrong epistemically. 
 
4. Comparisons 
As a second step towards defending KAA, we compare our explanation of the intuitions 
regarding Spiro with the explanation offered by EKAA on the counts of simplicity, coherence 
with action, and coherence with other theories of knowledge. Along the way, we elucidate our 
explanation further. 
 Starting with simplicity, we argue that our account is simpler. Whereas Turri needs to 
introduce the notion of expressing in his account of assertion, we just defend the ‘simple 
knowledge account of assertion’, as Turri calls it. Assuming that the simpler account is the 
better one (ceteris paribus), our account is preferable.  
 Turri might object that, even though we give a simpler account of assertion, we pay 
the price of giving a more complex account of our intuitions. We reply, first, that the notion of 
assertoric unsafety is a notion everyone needs to account for the possibility that asserters who 
assert permissibly can nonetheless be untrustworthy asserters. For even if an asserter in fact 
expresses her knowledge that P, there can still be reason to distrust her qua asserter if she had 
resolved to assert P no matter what, e.g., also without knowing that P. We reply, second, that 
our taint-of-unsafety account is just an instance of a widely documented fact about human 
psychology that Gendler [2006] has called imaginative contagion. When people imagine other 
possible worlds, their assessment of what is permissible in the actual world becomes 
contaminated by what would have been permissible in the possible worlds they imagine. For 
instance, when asked to imagine a library, people will start to behave more quietly than the 
actual circumstances call for. Or, after having been led to think about rudeness, people will 
tend to interrupt a conversation sooner than when they were led to think about politeness 
[ibid.: 193–4]. There is sufficient evidence, then, that considering other salient possible 
worlds contaminates our intuitions about permissibility. 
 Turning to coherence with action, we argue that our account coheres with intuitions 
about action better than EKAA. Assuming that the account that best coheres with action is the 
better one, our account is preferable. 
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 For the sake of argument we concede to Turri that there might be a difference between 
‘permissibly A-ing’ and ‘A-ing with authority’, as Turri’s executioner case is supposed to 
illustrate. But contra Turri, in order to establish clear coherence between action and EKAA, 
the executioner case shouldn’t have been one where Executioner is authorised to act yet only 
permitted to act in the appropriate way. Such a case is analogous to an assertion that is 
authorised but impermissible because made in an inappropriate way, e.g., while screaming. A 
properly analogous case would have been one where Executioner kills Prisoner without the 
kill expressing the authority. But the kill in such an analogous case seems to be both 
authorised and permissible: 
 
Modified Executioner Case (MEC) 
Executioner is authorized by Boss to kill Prisoner. At the designated time and place, 
Executioner gives Prisoner the fatal injection, but does so solely out of a deep hatred 
for Prisoner. 
 
Executioner has acted permissibly; he acted in the appointed way. Even if Boss would come 
to know about Executioner’s motive, Boss couldn’t fire him on the grounds of having acted 
impermissibly. The underlying problem brought out by MEC is that, although ‘permissibly A-
ing’ may indeed require that one A in an appropriate way, ‘expressing’ doesn’t describe a way 
of A-ing, the presence or absence of which makes an intuitive normative difference. 
Crucially, however, since according to Turri the absence of expressing in cases of assertion 
does make an intuitive normative difference, we conclude that the coherence between action 
and EKAA is less than optimal. 
 Pro our account, it does provide a convincing treatment of MEC. We say that 
Executioner’s killing was permissible but unsafe. In nearby possible worlds, Executioner 
might have killed without being authorised, and this makes him an unstable executioner, not 
to be trusted with the life of prisoners. Indeed, it is this unsafety for which Executioner might 
be reprimanded. Thus, we conclude that our explanation of Spiro in terms of assertoric 
unsafety finds similar treatment in properly analogous cases of action. An assertion that 
doesn’t express knowledge yet is made while knowing is permissible but unsafe. An action 
that doesn’t express authority yet is made while being authorised is permissible but unsafe.  
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 Concluding with coherence with other theories of knowledge, we argue that Turri’s 
account shows only a partial analogy with virtue epistemology and that the same is true of our 
account. Assuming that the account that best coheres with other theories of knowledge is the 
better one, neither account is preferable over the other on this count. 
 Turri points to a structural analogy between EKAA and virtue epistemology: 
‘Knowledge is true belief manifesting virtue, and [permissible] assertion is speech 
manifesting knowledge’ [2011: 42]. But this analogy captures only part of what is central to 
virtue epistemology: a virtuous believer manifests virtue not only (a) by having true beliefs 
because of her intellectually virtuous character (or: by ‘expressing’ this character), but also 
(b) by being a reliable believer, i.e., someone who has mostly true beliefs and would not 
easily have had those same beliefs had they been false (or: by having epistemically safe true 
beliefs). Turri’s expressing condition is analogous with (a) but not with (b). It guarantees that 
asserters assert things because they know, but not that they would not have made those same 
assertions had they not known. For an assertion that expresses knowledge can still be 
assertorically unsafe if the asserter had resolved to make the assertion regardless of whether 
she knew or not. The analogy between EKAA and virtue epistemology that Turri points to is 
thus at best partial. 
 Our notion of assertoric (un)safety is analogous with (b). A virtuous believer is a 
reliable believer. Analogously, an assertorically safe asserter would be a reliable asserter: 
someone who asserts things she knows and who wouldn’t easily have asserted these things 
had she not known them. The notion of assertoric safety fits into a unified perspective on 
reliable acquisition of knowledge (where epistemic safety is crucial) and reliable distribution 
of knowledge (where assertoric safety is crucial). Hence, our account is also partially 
analogous to virtue epistemology. EKAA doesn’t have a dialectical advantage here.  
 We conclude that our account outperforms EKAA. It is simpler. It finds a more natural 
companionship in action. And it coheres with virtue epistemology just as well. There is no 
need to abandon KAA.1  
 
Delft University of Technology & VU University Amsterdam 
 
                                                
1 We are indebted to Tamar Szabó Gendler, Jonathan Schaffer, John Turri, René van Woudenberg, and two 
anonymous referees for feedback and insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
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